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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this 
appeal under U.C.A. §§78-2a-3(2)(i) and Rule 3(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. This appeal is from the order of 
the District Court entered on January 23, 1995 directing that all 
prior orders of the Court were final and there was no just reason 
for delay under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Whether Mrs. Hammond (now known and hereinafter 
referred to as "Mrs. Dennison") has shown by clear and convincing 
evidence that Mr. Hammond is in contempt of any court order. 
Applicable Standard of Review: The trial court's legal 
conclusion that defendant is in contempt of court is reviewed for 
correctness and is given no special deference on appeal. State 
v. Long, 844 P.2d 381 (Utah App. 1992). The findings of fact are 
given great deference in divorce cases and the appellate court 
does not overturn them unless they are clearly erroneous. Richie 
v. Richie, 784 P.2d 465 (Utah App. 1989). A finding of fact is 
clearly erroneous if it violates the standards set by the 
appellate court, is against the clear weight of the evidence, or, 
the reviewing court is "left with a definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been committed" even though there is evidence 
to support the finding. Cumminas v. Cumminqs, 821 P.2d 472, 476 
(Utah App. 1991). 
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II. Whether the court erred in ordering Mr. Hammond to 
pay Mrs. Dennison $505.05 per month for a period of 218 
consecutive months and to serve 3 0 days in jail for his contempt. 
Applicable Standard of Review: The trial court's 
judgment is a matter of law and conclusions of law are review for 
correctness and are given no special deference on appeal. 
Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065 (Utah App. 1994). The trial 
court has discretion to require Mr. Hammond to serve 30 days in 
jail for his contempt and said discretion will be upheld absent 
manifest injustice or inequity that indicates an abuse of 
discretion. Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818 (Utah App. 1992). 
III. Whether the trial court erred in denying Mr. 
Hammond's motion to dismiss. 
Applicable Standard of Review: Said motion was argued 
at the conclusion of Mrs. Dennison's case at the hearing on 
October 15, 1993. (R. 674). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, 
the trial court is obligated to look at the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences that fairly may be drawn therefrom in the 
light favorable to the party moved against and determine if 
plaintiff has convincingly shown a right to relief and on appeal 
the reviewing court looks at the evidence in the same manner. 
Johnson v. Bell. 666 P.2d 308 (Utah 1983). 
IV. Whether Mrs. Dennison should be awarded attorney's 
fees. 
Applicable Standard of Review: The trial court has 
discretion to so require and said discretion will be upheld 
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absent manifest injustice or inequity that indicates an abuse of 
discretion. Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818 (Utah App. 1992). 
APPLICABLE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Persons against whom action for contempt may be 
brought: 
U.C.A. §78-32-1(5) (1993): 
The following acts or omissions in respect to a 
court or proceedings therein are contempts of the 
authority of the court: 
. . . . 
(5) Disobedience of any lawful judgment, order or 
process of the court. 
Power of the court to punish for contempt: 
U.C.A. §78-7-17(2) (1993): 
Every judicial officer has power: 
. . . . 
(2) to compel obedience to his lawful orders 
as provided by law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about March 23, 1993 Mrs. Dennison commenced the 
instant proceedings by filing her Verified Motion for Order to 
Show Cause. (R. 293 - 312) . Said motion requested the following 
relief: 
a. For judgment in the amount of $1,515.15 
representing Mrs. Dennison's share of the HHEICO 
payments for January, February and March, 1993. 
b. For an order requiring Mr. Hammond to give 
Mrs. Dennison a copy of the HHEICO contract and all 
documents relating thereto. 
c. For an order requiring Mr. Hammond to sign 
necessary documents to allow the obligors on the HHEICO 
contract to pay Mrs. Dennison directly. 
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d. For judgment in the amount of $453.34 
representing Mr. Hammond's share of unpaid medical 
bills. 
e. For judgment in the amount of $937.50 
representing one-half of the children's orthodontia 
expenses. 
f. For judgment in the amount of $400.00 
representing Mrs. Dennison's share of the sale proceeds 
of the Pontiac automobile. 
g. For an Order finding Mr. Hammond in contempt 
of the provisions of the Decree of Divorce. 
h. For an award of attorney's fees and costs. 
(R. 295). 
The Order to Show Cause was heard by Commissioner 
Arnett and on June 11, 1993 Mr. Hammond objected thereto. (R. 
322-323) . After hearing the arguments of counsel on August 11, 
1993 in regard thereto the Court ruled, among other things, that 
the decree did not restrict Mr. Hammond from selling the 
contract, however, the issue of contempt with regard to whether 
the note was discounted inappropriately was reserved for trial. 
The written order regarding the hearing on August 11, 1993 was 
not submitted to or signed by the trial court. (R. 355 and 487). 
Accordingly, some of said issues remain pending and some of said 
issues were included in the order entered on December 13, 1994. 
(R. 590). 
On February 8, 1994 Mr. Hammond file an Objection to 
and Motion to Alter or Amend Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, Order and Judgment, or, in the Alternative, Motion for New 
Trial. (R. 415). A hearing was held on said motion on April 11, 
1994. (R. 466). On May 16, 1994 the trial court ruled that the 
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trial should be re-opened "for the limited purpose of hearing 
evidence concerning whether the defendant had the right under the 
Decree to encumber the HHEICO contract, whether he had the right 
to encumber the contract without the consent of plaintiff, and 
whether his conduct of pledging the HHEICO contract without the 
plaintiff's consent constitutes contempt of court." (R. 486). 
Said trial was held on August 31, 1994 and the order in 
regard thereto was entered on December 13, 1994. (R. 524 and 
590). On January 23, 1995 the trial court entered its order 
which determined that there was no just reason for delay and 
directed that the prior orders and judgments were final. (R. 
615) . 
The following facts are divided into numbered 
paragraphs to make reference thereto more convenient: 
1. The Decree of Divorce between Mr. Hammond and Mrs. 
Dennison was entered on May 21, 1991. (R. 268). 
2. The only language in the Decree of Divorce 
regarding the HHEICO contract is as follows: "The plaintiff is 
awarded sixty-five percent (65%) of the net proceeds of the 
HHEICO contract and the defendant is awarded thirty-five percent 
(35%) of the net proceeds of the HHEICO contract. The current 
net proceeds from the HHEICO contract are $777.00 per.(sic) The 
plaintiff is entitled to receive $505.05 per month and the 
defendant is entitled to receive $271.95 per month from the 
HHEICO contract. In the event that the net amount received from 
the HHEICO contract shall differ from the $777.00 per month, then 
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the parties shall divide the net proceeds sixty-five percent 
(65%) to the plaintiff and thirty-five percent (35%) to the 
defendant." (R. 268-275). 
3. An All-inclusive Promissory Note Secured by All-
inclusive Trust Deed dated May 29, 1990 from Robert S. Nichol and 
Sandra Kistler to Mr. Hammond is the document which is referred 
to as the HHEICO contract. (R. 63 6 and 717). 
4. Said note also sets forth the terms of an 
obligation on which Mr. Hammond is the sole obligor and C & N 
Investments is the obligee which obligation is also secured by a 
senior trust deed against the same property. (R. 368-369). 
5. The Decree of Divorce does not contain any language 
which restricts Mr. Hammond from selling, transferring or 
encumbering the HHEICO contract. (R. 268-275). 
6. On November 3, 1992 Mr. Hammond borrowed $25,000.00 
from David Moench which was secured by giving Mr. Moench an 
assignment of the HHEICO contract which assignment included an 
option for the HHEICO contract to be assigned back to Mr. Hammond 
upon payment of the loan. (R. 722 and 744) . 
7. Said loan was due in full on January 3, 1993. (R. 
731) . 
8. The purpose of said loan was to use the proceeds in 
such a fashion that Mr. Hammond could obtain sufficient funds to 
repay the Moench loan and also to purchase the interest of his 
son-in-law and daughter in the marital residence which Mr. 
Hammond and a minor child of the parties shared with the son-in-
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law and daughter so that the residence of Mr. Hammond and the 
minor child would not have to be sold. (R. 720-722). 
9. The loan proceeds were paid directly from Mr. 
Moench to Mr. LaRoy Orr pursuant to a loan agreement between Mr. 
Hammond to Mr. Orr which provided that said loan together with an 
additional $10,000.00 was to be paid to Mr. Hammond on or before 
January 3, 1993. Said loan proceeds were to be used for the 
purchase of land and not in any other manner. (R. 722-723 and 
759-760). 
10. Before making the loan to Mr. Orr, Mr. Hammond 
talked with several of Mr. Hammond's friends who knew Mr. Orr and 
was assured that Mr. Orr would perform as he promised. (R. 723). 
11. At the time that Mr. Hammond obtained the loan, he 
had just gone through a couple of periods of unemployment and he 
had no other means to purchase the interest of his son-in-law and 
daughter in order to provide a stable residence for the minor 
child. (R. 720-721). 
12. On or about December 15, 1993 when Mr. Hammond 
learned that Mr. Orr was not going to perform as he promised, Mr. 
Hammond obtained an extension from Mr. Moench and attempted to 
obtain a loan so that he could pay Mr. Moench as required. (R. 
726 and 728). 
13. Mr. Hammond was unable to pay Mr. Moench as 
required and Mr. Moench assumed possession of the HHEICO contract 
and the payments pursuant thereto. Mr. Hammond no longer has any 
right, interest or claim to the HHEICO contract. (R. 727). 
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14. Mr. Hammond did not intend to lose his rights, 
interest and claim in the HHEICO contract or that Mrs. Dennison 
would not receive her portion of the net proceeds. (R. 730) . 
15. Mr. Hammond has not received any proceeds pursuant 
to the HHEICO contract since December, 1993. (R. 730-731). 
16. In opposition to the Order to Show Cause Mr. 
Hammond submitted an affidavit explaining, among other things, 
that Mr. Hammond had provided all of the support for the two 
minor children of the parties; that one of the two minor children 
had resided with him since the divorce decree; that the other 
minor child had lived at a separate residence until her marriage; 
and that Mr. Hammond was not receiving any proceeds from the 
document referred to as the HHEICO contract. (R. 317-320). 
17. In Mr. Hammond's objection to the commissioner's 
recommendation he explained that he was not in any way restricted 
by the Decree of Divorce from assigning or selling the HHEICO 
contract and, since he no longer had an interest in said 
contract, there was no obligation to make payments to Mrs. 
Dennison as though he was receiving monthly payments pursuant to 
said contract. (R. 325-326). 
18. Mrs. Dennison filed a Response to Objection to 
Commissioner's Recommendation and, in regard to the HHEICO 
contract, argued that in contravention of the Decree of Divorce, 
Mr. Hammond had assigned and encumbered the HHEICO contract so 
that Mrs. Dennison was no longer being paid a monthly amount. 
(R. 332). 
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19. In Mr. Hammond's Reply in Support of Objection to 
Commissioner's Recommendation, Mr. Hammond again explained that 
there was no contravention in the Decree of Divorce against his 
assigning or transferring the HHEICO contract and that Mrs. 
Dennison's right pursuant to the Decree of Divorce is a right to 
a portion of the net proceeds if there are any net proceeds. (R. 
339) . 
20. Mr. Hammond's Objection to Commissioner's 
Recommendation, Mrs. Dennison's Response to Objection to 
Commissioner's Recommendation and Mr. Hammond's Reply in Support 
of Objection to Commissioner's Recommendation were filed with the 
Court prior to the hearing on Mr. Hammond's objection to the 
recommendation and courtesy copies of the above were provided to 
the Court. (R. 433). 
21. After the hearing on August 11, 1993 the Court 
ruled as follows: 
With regard to the HHEICO contract, first, it 
appears to me the Decree did not restrict Mr. Hammond 
from selling the contract, although clearly the 
contract provided for an income stream and it may have 
been contemplated that that would be an asset that 
would continue on. It seems to me at a minimum, that 
Mrs. Hammond is entitled to 65 percent of the value — 
well, of the net proceeds from the sale of that note. 
With regard to whether the note was discounted 
inappropriately in violation of the Decree and what was 
implicit in that Decree, it seems to me that there is 
not sufficient evidence before the Court to make a 
determination as to that now, that that should be 
reserved for trial. And therefore, the issue of 
contempt on that issue is reserved for trial. That 
there would need to be information presented to the 
Court as to the market value of that note, maybe at the 
time of the Decree but certainly at the time it was 
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sold, and what attempts were made to sell it and 
whether it was discounted inappropriately. 
(R. 451-452). 
22. During the trial regarding the above-stated issue 
on October 15, 1993 the trial court stated on a couple of 
occasions that Mr. Hammond was not restricted by the Decree of 
Divorce from selling or transferring the HHEICO contract. (R. 
676 and 679). 
23. On one such occasion trial court stated: "Well, 
that's not entirely correct though, Mr. Hanks, because the Decree 
says that he is entitled to sell the note." (R. 679). 
24. Mr. Hammond testified that, based in part upon 
proceedings during the pendency of the divorce action, he 
understood that he could sell or transfer said contract and that 
Mrs. Dennison did not have any interest in the HHEICO contract. 
(R. 693, 736, 745-746 and 755-756.). 
25. There was no evidence presented by Mrs. Dennison 
at the time of trial regarding the fair market value of the 
HHEICO contract and, instead, Mrs. Dennison argued that the 
remaining balance of the contract was its fair market value. (R. 
624-674 and 677-679). 
26. The only evidence regarding the fair market value 
of the HHEICO contract was the testimony of Mr. Poulsen that he 
paid approximately $30,000.00 for the contract (R. 763) and the 
testimony of Mr. Hammond. 
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27. There was no evidence of the amount that the 
parties or Mrs. Dennison would have received under the HHEICO 
contract. (R. 624-698 and 704-771). 
28. There was evidence from Mr. Hammond and Mr. 
Poulsen that it appeared that the contract might be paid off 
before the end of the contract. (R. 754 and 764-765). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Hammond did not know that he did not have the right 
to transfer the HHEICO contract and did not knowingly and 
wilfully violate any court order. Because of his financial 
circumstances he did not have the ability to perform the alleged 
court order. 
There was no evidence of the damages suffered by Mrs. 
Dennison except speculation by the court that the HHEICO contract 
would not be paid off prior to amortized payment schedule. 
Accordingly, the court exceeded its power in ordering Mr. Hammond 
to pay Mrs. Dennison payments of $505.05 per month for 218 
months. No evidence was presented of obstinacy and, accordingly, 
the trial court abused its discretion in ordering Mr. Hammond to 
serve 30 days in jail for doing that which he thought he had the 
right to do. 
No evidence was presented regarding whether the HHEICO 
contract was inappropriately discounted and Mrs. Dennison's case 
should have been dismissed at the conclusion of her presentation 
of evidence. There are no findings and no evidence regarding Mr. 
Hammond's ability to pay Mrs. Dennison's attorney's fees and the 
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reasonableness of said fees and, accordingly, said award should 
be reversed and Mr. Hammond should be award his attorney's fees 
incurred herein. 
ARGUMENT 
I. MR. HAMMOND IS NOT IN CONTEMPT OF ANY COURT ORDER. 
In Utah Farm Production Credit Ass'n v. Labrum, 762 P.2d 
1070, 1074 (Utah 1988) the Utah Supreme Court stated as follows: 
To be held in contempt, a party must have (1) known of 
the duty imposed by the court's order, (2) had the 
ability to comply with the order, and (3) willfully and 
knowingly refused to comply. 
In Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1172 (Utah 1988) the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that: "These three elements must be proven . 
. . by clear and convincing evidence in a civil contempt 
proceeding." In the instant matter Mrs. Dennison has not proven 
any of the three elements by clear and convincing evidence. 
A. The Decree of Divorce does not impose a duty by its language 
to not sell, transfer or encumber the HHEICO contract. 
The simple existence of the trial court7s ruling on 
August 11, 1993 that the Decree of Divorce does not restrict Mr. 
Hammond from selling or transferring the HHEICO contract 
demonstrates that the Decree of Divorce does not impose by its 
language a known duty to not encumber the HHEICO contract. If 
such a duty were sufficiently stated in the Decree of Divorce the 
trial court would not have ruled, after extensive briefing and 
argument, that the Decree of Divorce did not restrict Mr. Hammond 
from selling or transferring the HHEICO contract. 
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The above-described issue was argued in Mr. Hammond's 
objection to the commissioner's recommendation, Mrs. Dennison's 
response thereto and Mr. Hammond's reply. It was addressed by 
both parties in their presentations to the judge. It clearly was 
fully briefed and explained to the trial court at the time of the 
hearing on August 11, 1993. 
Mrs. Dennison acknowledges in her Response to 
Defendant's Motion to Alter or Amend Findings or in the 
Alternative for a New Trial that the Court ruled on August 11, 
1993 that Mr. Hammond was not restricted from selling or 
transferring the HHEICO contract. (R. 423-424 and 426). Mrs. 
Dennison further acknowledges on page 7 of ^aid response that no, 
new material facts were presented at the hearing on October 15, 
1993. (R. 427). The evidence presented at said hearing had 
nothing to do with said issue and there was no basis for the 
trial court to find thereafter a duty to not sell, transfer, 
assign or encumber the HHEICO contract. 
Whether the divorce decree is ambiguous is a question 
of law which this Court reviews for correctness, according no 
particular deference to the trial court's conclusions. Lyncrle v. 
Lyngle. 831 P.2d 1027 (Utah App. 1992). There is no ambiguity in 
the Decree of Divorce in the instant case regarding the HHEICO 
contract. The trial court's ruling on August 11, 1993 so 
demonstrates. Accordingly, the trial court erred if it found 
facts respecting the intention of the parties based upon 
extrinsic evidence. However, the trial court appears to have 
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only relied upon the language of the Decree of Divorce. (R. 
707) . 
There is no command in the instant Decree of Divorce 
that Mr. Hammond refrain from selling, transferring or 
encumbering the HHEICO contract. In Goodover v. Lindey/s Inc., 
847 P.2d 699, 701 (Mont. 1993) the Montana Supreme Court stated 
as follows: 
If there is no command, there is no disobedience. A 
person may not be held in contempt of court for 
violating an order, unless the terms of the order are 
definite, certain and specific. 
In Finding of Fact No. 11 in the instant case the trial court 
acknowledges that there is no specific provision of the decree 
which contains any such restriction. (R. 599). Mrs. Dennison's 
argument is that Mr. Hammond was suppose to know from the spirit 
of the Decree of Divorce. 
Furthermore, there was no evidence at all that Mr. 
Hammond understood that he was restricted from selling, 
transferring or encumbering the contract. The only evidence 
presented by Mrs. Dennison was that Mr. Hammond had knowledge of 
paragraph 7 of the Decree of Divorce and that Mr. Hammond did not 
like the language of paragraph 7 but did nothing in regard 
thereto because he thought it was too late. (R. 735-736). 
Mr. Hammond testified that he understood that he always 
had the right to sell or transfer said contract. The evidence 
was that Mr. Hammond was the sole holder of the promissory note 
referred to as the HHEICO contract and always had been the sole 
holder. (R. 718). Mr. Hammond is the original beneficiary of 
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the trust deed which secures said note. (R. 717). Mr. Hammond 
is the sole maker on the senior obligation and the sole grantor 
of the senior trust deed securing said obligation. (R. 719). It 
was intended that the HHEICO note remain in Mr. Hammond's 
possession and control. (R. 717-718 and 732). It was intended 
that Mr. Hammond be the only one to receive the payments and that 
he be the only one obligated to make the payments on the senior 
obligation. (R. 732) . If no net proceeds were received, then 
Mrs. Dennison was not entitled to any proceeds and she never has 
had the right to sue the obligor on said note. All of this 
uncontroverted evidence proves that Mr. Hammond, from the 
commencement of its existence, has had the right to sell, 
transfer or encumber the HHEICO contract. 
This was not in any manner changed by the Decree of 
Divorce as the Court ruled on August 11, 1993. There is nothing 
in the Decree of Divorce that states anything similar to a 
restriction regarding the sell, transfer or encumbrance of the 
HHEICO contract. In fact, the Decree of Divorce specifically 
contemplates the situation wherein the net amount received is 
other than $777.00 per month and provides that Mrs. Dennison 
shall receive 65% of the net amount received. Restrictions could 
easily have been placed upon Mr. Hammond if it had been so 
intended. Said restrictions must be there explicitly in order to 
create a known duty, which did not previously exist, to not sell, 
transfer, assign or encumber said contract. 
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The Law of the Case Doctrine, as applied to prior court 
rulings, "expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to 
reopen what has been decided." Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 
436, 444 (1912). See, U.C.A. §78-7-19 (1991). In 21 C.J.S. 
Courts §195 (1940) this principle is stated as follows: 
[W]here a court has considered and determined a point 
in a case, its conclusion thereon becomes the law of 
that case, unless or until reversed or modified by an 
appellate court . . . . Such a decision, as the law of 
the case, is binding on the courts, as well as on the 
parties . . . . 
In the instant case one of the issues before the trial 
court on August 11, 1993 was whether Mr. Hammond was restricted 
from selling, transferring or encumbering the HHEICO contract. 
This issue was addressed in Mr. Hammond's objection to the 
commissioner's recommendation, Mrs. Dennison's response and Mr. 
Hammond's reply which were filed with the Court prior to the 
August 11, 1993 hearing and courtesy copies thereof were provided 
to the Court. The trial court ruled at that hearing that the 
Decree of Divorce did not restrict Mr. Hammond from selling the 
HHEICO contact and that the only issue to be tried on October 15, 
1993 was the fair market value of the HHEICO contract and whether 
it was inappropriately discounted when Mr. Hammond transferred 
said contract. 
Pursuant to the law of the case Mr. Hammond was not 
restricted from selling, transferring or encumbering the HHEICO 
contract. Mr. Hammond, in his attempt to preserve a stable 
environment for the minor children of the parties, did not 
violate any known duty imposed by a court order when he pledged 
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the HHEICO contract as security for a loan. Accordingly, this 
Court should find, as the trial court stated on several 
occasions, that there are no restrictions in the Decree of 
Divorce regarding the sell, transfer or encumbrance of the HHEICO 
contract. 
B. Mr. Hammond did not have the ability to comply with the court 
order and did not willfully and knowingly refuse to comply with 
the order. 
Mrs. Dennison did not meet her burden of proving, by 
clear and convincing evidence, that Mr. Hammond had the ability 
to comply with the court order. The evidence presented by Mrs. 
Dennison was that Mr. Hammond could have attempted to find a two 
bedroom apartment for the amount of approximately $550.00 per 
month. Mr. Hammond testified that he had been unemployed at the 
time he borrowed money from Mr. Moench. He did not have 
resources to find other housing and he was trying to preserve a 
stable situation for himself and the minor child. 
Furthermore, there was absolutely no evidence that Mr. 
Hammond willfully and knowingly refused to comply with the Decree 
of Divorce. In Utah Farm Production Credit Ass'n v. Labrum, 762 
P. 2d 1070, (Utah 1988) found that an individual must have 
knowledge of what is required of him together with acts which are 
in violation of that known duty before he has willfully and 
knowingly refused to obey a court order. All of the above 
uncontroverted evidence demonstrates that Mr. Hammond's frame of 
mind was that he could encumber the HHEICO contract. There was 
no evidence of any other frame of mind. 
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Accordingly, this Court should find that Mr. Hammond is 
not in contempt for doing that which the trial court, on several 
occasions, acknowledged that he could do. 
C. The findings of the trial court are inadequate to support a 
holding of contempt. 
The findings herein, as required in Von Hake, are 
inadequate for review because they are not "sufficiently detailed 
and [do not] include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the 
steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was 
reached." Rucker v. Dalton. 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979). In 
the instant case there are no subsidiary facts but only ultimate 
conclusions. 
Finding of Fact No. 9 states that the Decree of Divorce 
clearly provides an income stream to Mrs. Dennison, that Mr. 
Hammond had knowledge of paragraph 7 of the decree and because he 
took no action to amend the decree it suggests that he was aware 
that there were limitations on what he could do. (R. 598-599). 
There were no other findings regarding the element that Mr. 
Hammond knew what was required of him. 
Finding of Fact No. 13 states that Mr. Hammond did not 
transfer the HHEICO contract because of financial duress or 
compulsion and that Mr. Hammond used his share of the proceeds 
from the sale of the home to pay a debt to his mother. The 
finding regarding the use of the sale proceeds to pay a debt does 
not in anyway demonstrate that Mr. Hammond had the ability to 
perform as required. Otherwise there are no findings regarding 
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Mr. Hammond's ability to perform as required by the Decree of 
Divorce. 
There are no findings regarding the element that Mr. 
Hammond knowingly and wilfully violated a court order. This 
court recently held in State v. Long, 844 P.2d 381, 387 (Utah 
App. 1992) that an express finding that an individual acted 
willfully, absent the subsidiary factual findings to support that 
conclusion, was insufficient and required reversal. Since there 
are no ultimate or subsidiary factual findings in this matter, it 
must be reversed. 
"[T]he finding of a person in contempt and sentencing 
him to jail is of very serious consequence to the person 
involved, somewhat akin to a criminal penalty." Thomas v. 
Thomas, 569 P.2d 1119, 1121 (Utah 1977). "The lack of explicit 
findings on each requisite element of contempt, and the lack of 
supporting subsidiary findings, cannot be lightly dismissed -
especially when criminal contempt and incarceration are at 
issue." Kunzler v. O'Dell, 855 P.2d 270, 278 (Utah App. 1993). 
The failure thereof in the instant matter requires that said 
holding be reversed. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT EXCEEDED ITS POWER IN ORDERING MR. 
HAMMOND TO REPAY MRS. DENNISON AND TO SERVE 30 DAYS IN 
JAIL. 
Paragraph 7 of the Decree of Divorce is the only 
provision of the Decree of Divorce which pertains to the HHEICO 
contract. Said paragraph provides as follows: 
The plaintiff is awarded sixty-five percent (65%) of 
the net proceeds of the HHEICO contract and the 
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defendant is awarded thirty-five percent (35%) of the 
net proceeds of the HHEICO contract. The current net 
proceeds from the HHEICO contract are $777.00 per.(sic) 
The plaintiff is entitled to receive $505.05 per month 
and the defendant is entitled to receive $271.95 per 
month from the HHEICO contract. In the event that the 
net amount received from the HHEICO contract shall 
differ from the $777.00 per month, then the parties 
shall divide the net proceeds sixty-five percent (65%) 
to the plaintiff and thirty-five percent (35%) to the 
defendant. 
The proceeding before the trial court was an order to 
show cause not a petition to modify. The court's ruling, in 
part, on the order to show cause was as follows: 
The Defendant is ordered to pay Plaintiff the amount of 
$505.05 per month, beginning the first day of the month 
following the entry of this order, for a period of 218 
consecutive months. . . . In the event the Defendant 
defaults in his monthly payment obligation to 
Plaintiff, the Plaintiff shall determine the net 
present value of the balance remaining to be owed to 
Plaintiff by discounting the dollar amount by the 
contract rate (9.75%) and shall be entitled to a 
judgment in that amount. 
This ruling of the trial court clearly modifies the Decree of 
Divorce. 
Rule 6-404(1) of the Utah Code of Judicial Procedure 
provides that "No request for a modification of an existing 
decree shall be raised by way of an order to show cause." The 
Decree of Divorce provides that Mrs. Dennison is awarded 65% of 
the net proceeds of the HHEICO contract. The trial court 
modified said provision and awarded Mrs. Dennison 218 monthly 
payments of $505.05 and, in the event of default, a judgment 
calculated by determining "the net present value of the balance 
remaining to be owed to plaintiff by discounting the dollar 
amount by the contract rate (9.75%) . . . ." There was no 
20 
evidence that the above provision represents the damages suffered 
by Mrs. Dennison except speculation by the court that the HHEICO 
contract would not be paid off prior to amortized payment 
schedule. Accordingly, the court exceeded its power and this 
provision should be removed from the order of the court. 
No evidence was presented of "obstinacy in 
disobedience", Thomas v. Thomas, 569 P.2d 1119, 1121 (Utah 1977), 
and, accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in 
ordering Mr. Hammond to serve 30 days in jail for doing that 
which he thought he had the right to do. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING MR. 
HAMMONDS MOTION TO DISMISS. 
At the conclusion of Mrs. Dennison7s case at the 
hearing on October 15, 1993 Mr. Hammond moved the court for a 
directed verdict of no cause of action which the trial court 
denied. (R. 674). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial 
court is obligated to look at the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences that fairly may be drawn therefrom in the light 
favorable to the party moved against and determine if plaintiff 
has convincingly shown a right to relief and on appeal the 
reviewing court looks at the evidence in the same manner. 
Johnson v. Bell, 666 P.2d 308 (Utah 1983). 
In the instant case the issues before the court at the 
hearing on October 15, 1993 were whether the note was discounted 
inappropriately in violation of the Decree and the issue of 
contempt on that issue. The trial court instructed that there 
would need to be information presented to the court as to the 
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market value of that note, maybe at the time of the Decree but 
certainly at the time it was sold, and what attempts were made to 
sell it and whether it was discounted inappropriately, (R. 451-
452) . 
At the trial the evidence presented by Mrs, Dennison 
consisted of her explanation of what the HHEICO contract was, the 
amount which she had received each month from Mr. Hammond and her 
statement that Mr. Hammond had never explained to her why he was 
not making payments to her. Mr. Hammond was called by Mrs. 
Dennison and he testified that he had read the Decree of Divorce, 
that his understanding was that when payments were made to him he 
would pay 65% to Mrs. Dennison, that $274,993 was owing subject 
to a prior obligation to First Security in an unknown amount, 
that he did not tell Mrs. Dennison when he no longer owned the 
HHEICO contract, that he stopped making payments to Mrs. Dennison 
when he no longer received payments, that the HHEICO contract was 
lost when he assigned it in order to borrow some money in an 
attempt to not be required to sell the home where he resided with 
the parties' minor child, that he did not have the financial 
ability to pay Mrs. Dennison 65% of the $25,000.00, that he had 
tried to obtain a loan to pay said amount to Mrs. Dennison. Mrs. 
Dennison was allowed to introduce an amortization schedule of the 
face amount of the HHEICO contract which did not include an 
amortization of the senior obligations and a schedule of payments 
over the objection of Mr. Hammond. Finally, Mr. Hanks testified 
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regarding the amount of attorney's fees charged to Mrs. Dennison 
and that said total amount was reasonable. 
Absolutely no evidence was presented on whether the HHEICO 
contract was discounted improperly and, accordingly, there was no 
evidence that Mr. Hammond was in contempt of a court order to not 
improperly discount the HHEICO contract. 
IV. MRS. DENNISON IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
In an action to enforce the provision of a decree of 
divorce, the trial court has discretion to award attorney's fees. 
Lynale v. Lyncrle. 831 P.2d 1027 (Utah 1992). In said action the 
court may disregard the financial need of the requesting party. 
Finlayson v. Finlayson, 874 P.2d 843 (Utah App. 1994). 
Accordingly, the trial court in the instant case must make 
adequate findings regarding the ability of Mr. Hammond to pay and 
the reasonableness of the requested fees. Potter v. Potter, 845 
P.2d 272 (Utah App. 1993). In the instant case there were no 
such findings. The only finding regarding attorney's fees is 
Finding of Fact No. 17 which does not contain any finding 
regarding reasonableness or the ability of Mr. Hammond to pay the 
requested fees. (R. 601). Accordingly, this court should reverse 
the award of attorney's fees to Mrs. Dennison. 
The evidence regarding the attorney's fees incurred by 
Mrs. Dennison is simply a lump sum without any itemization and, 
therefore, there is no way to determine if it is reasonable. 
Because the evidence is in this form, the court cannot separate 
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out any amounts for various services, and, therefore, should not 
award any fees to Mrs. Dennison. 
It is an abuse of discretion to award Mrs. Dennison 
attorney's fees when she did not prevail and, in fact, should not 
prevail on any aspect of her order to show cause. The Verified 
Motion for Order to Show Cause contained eight issues. Mrs. 
Dennison prevailed at the trial court on two of said issues. One 
issue, regarding the cemetery lots, was not properly part of the 
proceeding as Mrs. Dennison has never attempted to do anything 
regarding the cemetery lots. 
In regard to the issues regarding contempt and the 
order of the court regarding payments to Mrs. Dennison, Mr. 
Hammond is not in contempt and Mrs. Dennison is not entitled to 
said payments. Accordingly, Mrs. Dennison did not prevail and 
should not be awarded any attorney's fees for having brought the 
contempt proceeding. Mr. Hammond should be awarded his 
attorney's fees and costs herein. 
CONCLUSION 
"[T]he criminal contempt power should only be used to 
sanction deliberate contumacious acts or omissions. As the 
United States Supreme Court has observed: xThe very amplitude of 
the [contempt] power is a warning to use it with discretion, and 
a command never to exert it where it is not necessary or 
proper.'" State v. Long, 844 P.2d at 387 (quoting Gompers v. 
Buck's Stove & Range Co.. 221 U.S. 418, 451, 31 S.Ct. 492, 502 
(1911). No deliberate contumacious acts exist herein. In the 
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instant case there was no clear and convincing evidence of a 
known duty imposed by the court's order; the ability to comply 
with the order; and willfully and knowingly refusing to comply 
with said order. The simple existence of the trial court's 
ruling on August 11, 1993 demonstrates that the Decree of Divorce 
does not impose a known duty by its language to not sell, 
transfer or encumber the HHEICO contract. Furthermore, the law 
of the case prevents the Court from now ruling that Mr. Hammond 
is in contempt for an act which it previously ruled he could do. 
Finally, the findings of the trial court are inadequate to 
support its holding of contempt. 
It was improper for the trial court to modify the 
Decree of Divorce and it exceed its power in ordering Mr. Hammond 
to make payments to Mrs. Dennison and in ordering a judgment in 
the event of default. Mr. Hammond should not be required to pay 
Mrs. Dennison any amounts for the sale of the Pontiac automobile. 
Since Mrs. Dennison did not prevail on her order to show cause, 
she should not have been awarded any attorney's fees. 
Respectfully submitted this 26th day of September, 
1994. 
DAVID J. HODGSON 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) copies of the 
foregoing to James B. Hanks, Judge Building, Suite 740, Salt Lake 
City, UT 84111-2204 this 26th day of September, 1995. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BERDENE D. HAMMOND, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DON LEE HAMMOND, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil Number: 894904063DA 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
The above matter came before the court on April 12, 1991, 
the Honorable Anne M. Stirba, Judge presiding for trial. The 
plaintiff was present in person and represented by counsel John 
B. Mason of Cohne, Rappaport & Segal. The defendant was present 
in person and represented by counsel Jimi Mitsunaga. The court 
having heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law does now enter its Decree of Divorce as follows: 
DECREE QF DIVORCE 
1. Each of the parties are awarded a Decree of Divorce 
against the other upon the grounds of irreconcilable 
differences. 
2. The parties shall have joint legal custody of the two 
(2) minor children of the parties, to wit: Sherry Hammond, born 
June 5, 1974 and Denise Hammond, born June 16, 1978 and the 
plaintiff shall be awarded sole physical custody of the 
children. The defendant is entitled to reasonable visitation 
and the exact days and times of visitation shall be agreed upon 
by the parties in the best interest of the children. In the 
event the parties cannot agree upon the exact days and times of 
visitation, then the defendant is awarded visitation with the 
minor children on alternate weekends beginning Friday at 6:00 
p. m. and returning the children to plaintiff on Sunday by 6: 00 
p.m. The defendant is awarded visitation one (1) evening per 
week commencing at 5: 00 p. m. and terminating at 8: 00 p. m. The 
defendant is awarded visitation on alternate holidays and on 
father7 s day and defendant' s birthday. The defendant is awarded 
visitation beginning Christmas day at 1: 00 p. m. and continuing 
through one-half (1/2) of the children's total Christmas school 
vacation. Defendant is awarded visitation for Thanksgiving in 
even-numbered calendar years commencing at 6: 00 p. m. on 
Wednesday until 6: 00 p. m. on Sunday. Defendant is awarded 
visitation for Easter in odd-numbered years commencing at 6: 00 
p. m. on Friday until 6: 00 p. m. on Sunday. Holidays take 
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precedence over the weekend visitation and no changes shall be 
made to the regular rotation of the alternating weekend schedule 
because of holidays. Defendant is awarded visitation for four 
(4) continuous weeks during the children's summer vacation. 
Defendant shall provide written notice of the dates to plaintiff 
at least thirty (30) days in advance of the four (4) week 
period. 
3. The defendant will pay to the plaintiff child support 
in the amount of $163. 52 per month per child for a total of 
$327.04 per month. The defendant shall pay child support for 
the parties minor children until said children die, marry or 
reach the age of eighteen (18) and graduate from high school 
with their regularly scheduled class, whichever occurs first. 
Child support will be paid through the Office of Recovery 
Services in one (1) lump sum on or before the 5th day of each 
month. 
4. If either the plaintiff or defendant is able to obtain 
health and accident insurance through their place of employment 
then the party who is able to obtain the coverage for the lowest 
cost shall provide the insurance coverage. In the event the 
plaintiff is unemployed or is unable to obtain health and 
accident insurance through her place of employment, then the 
defendant shall provide health and accident insurance for the 
benefit of the minor children of the parties. Any medical or 
dental expenses incurred for the children which are not paid by 
the policy of insurance shall be shared equally by the parties. 
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The plaintiff is ordered to provide to the defendant medical and 
dental expense records for the years 1990 and 1991 which were 
not covered by health and accident insurance and the defendant 
is ordered to pay one-half (1/2) of the uncovered expenses. The 
defendant shall continue in full force and effect his existing 
life insurance policy in the amount of $38,000.00. He shall 
designate the minor children as beneficiaries of the policy and 
shall name his mother, Jane Hammond, as Trustee for the children 
under the policy. The defendant is ordered to maintain such 
policy until the defendant is no longer required to pay child 
support. 
5. The defendant is ordered to pay the debt due on his 
life insurance policy to Beneficial Life Insurance Company and 
he shall hold the plaintiff harmless therefrom. Any debt due by 
the plaintiff on any policy of insurance on her life shall be 
paid by plaintiff and she shall hold the defendant harmless 
therefrom. 
6. The plaintiff waived any right she may have to alimony 
and therefore no award of alimony is made by this court. 
7. The plaintiff is awarded sixty-five percent (65%) of 
the net proceeds of the HHEICO contract and the defendant is 
awarded thirty-five percent (35%) of the net proceeds of the 
HHEICO contract. The current net proceeds from the HHEICO 
contract are $777.00 per. The plaintiff is entitled to receive 
$505.05 per month and the defendant is entitled to receive 
$271. 95 per month from the HHEICO contract. In the event the 
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net amount received from the HHEICO contract shall differ from 
the $777.00 per month, then the parties shall divide the net 
proceeds sixty-five percent (65%) to the plaintiff and thirty-
five percent (35%) to the defendant. 
8. The home located at 2440 Vail Circle, Sandy, Utah 
94092 shall be listed for sale until it is sold. The listing 
price shall initially be determined by Mr. Fred Law, the realtor 
with whom the property is currently listed. Upon sale of the 
property, any equity after payment of the mortgage and any liens 
on the property and payment of realtor' s fees and any other 
costs associated with the sale of the home shall be divided one-
half (1/2) to the plaintiff and one-half (1/2) to the defendant. 
During the time the home is for sale and until the sale of the 
home occurs, the plaintiff shall not cohabit with anyone in the 
home. In the event the plaintiff cohabits in the home then the 
defendant' s equity shall be determined as of that date and the 
plaintiff shall make immediate payment to the defendant of the 
net equity to which he would be entitled after deducting the 
mortgage and any other liens against the property and after 
deducting any realtor' s fees and any costs associated with the 
sale of the property. The current monthly mortgage payment on 
the home is $987.00 per month. The defendant shall immediately 
bring current the house payments, however, the defendant shall 
not be required to make house payments that are in arrears in an 
amount that exceeds $2,961.00, the equivalent of three (3) 
monthly payments. The plaintiff shall continue to have the 
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right to reside in the home until such time as the home is sold. 
Commencing May 1, 1991/ the defendant shall pay one-half (1/2) 
of the monthly mortgage payment in the amount of $493.50 and the 
defendant shall pay one-half (1/2) of the monthly mortgage 
payment in the amount of $493.50. 
9. It is ordered that each party shall retain his or her 
own respective IRA accounts, retirement accounts, pension plans, 
profit sharing plans, stocks, bonds and/or other securities. 
10. Each party is awarded one (1) of the cemetery lots. 
11. Any previous judgments obtained by the plaintiff 
against the defendant arising out of this action are considered 
to be satisfied. 
12. Each party is awarded the personal property in their 
respective possessions with the exception that the defendant 
will receive the following: orange couch, love seat, rocking 
chair, lamp, vespa scooter, and one-half (1/2) of the food 
storage. 
13. The 1988 Toyota automobile is awarded to the defendant 
subject to any debt thereon and he shall hold the plaintiff 
harmless therefrom. The plaintiff is awarded the 1988 
Mitsubishi automobile subject to any debt thereon and she shall 
hold the defendant harmless therefrom. The 1978 Pontiac 
automobile shall be sold to the parties daughter for a 
reasonable amount and the proceeds divided fifty percent (50%) 
to the plaintiff and fifty percent (50%) to the defendant. 
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14. The defendant is ordered to assume and pay the 
obligation owed to Jane Hammond in the approximate principal 
amount of $5, 100. 00 and he shall hold the plaintiff harmless 
therefrom. 
15. Each party is ordered to be responsible for his or her 
own debt incurred subsequent to the date of separation, that 
date being November 1, 1989, and that each is ordered to hold 
the other harmless therefrom. 
16. With respect to the condominium described as Unit 
105, Building D, Sunwest Resort, Springdale, Utah, the parties 
shall each be responsible for any deficiency pursuant to the 
documents they may have previously executed with the lender on 
the property or according to law. 
17. The issue of contempt relating to the defendant is 
hereby dismissed. 
18. The defendant is ordered to pay to plaintiff one-half 
(1/2) of the 1989 federal tax refund or the amount of $750.00 
and plaintiff shall have judgment against the defendant for that 
amount. 
19. The defendant is ordered to pay one-half (1/2) of the 
attorney7 s fees incurred by the plaintiff, that being the amount 
of $4,591. 75 and that the plaintiff shall have judgment against 
the defendant in said amount. 
20. The defendant is ordered to assume and pay his own 
attorney' s fees. 
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DATED this 7\^r day of May, 1991. 
BY THE COURT: : 
Anne M.. ^ feir^^ 
DistrictSJT^""- "^  
to form: 
Jimi Mitsunaga 
Attorney for Defendant 
y/^ /f/ 
(hammond. dec/kk) 
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John B. Mason (2111) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
525 East 100 South, Suite 500 
P. 0. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BERDENE D. HAMMOND, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
v. ; 
DON LEE HAMMOND, 
Defendant. 
> FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
1 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i Civil Number: 894904063DA 
i Judge Anne M. Stirba 
The above matter came before the court on Friday, the 12th 
day of April, 1991, at the hour of 9: 00 a. m. , the Honorable Anne 
M. Stirba, Judge presiding for trial. The plaintiff was present 
in person and represented by counsel John B. Mason of Cohne, 
Rappaport & Segal. The defendant was present in person and 
represented by counsel, Jimi Mitsunaga. The parties represented 
to the court that they had entered into an oral agreement in 
settlement of all issues brought before the court by the 
complaint of the plaintiff and the counterclaim of the defendant 
except for the issues of attorney7 s fees and distribution of the 
parties 1989 federal tax refund. The parties advised the Court 
of the oral agreement. The court having considered the oral 
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agreement and finding it reasonable in its terms did approve the 
settlement entered into between the parties. The court then 
proceeded on April 12 to try the issues of attorney' s fees and 
distribution of the 1989 tax return. The court having 
considered the testimony of the witnesses presented, having 
reviewed the exhibits admitted into evidence, the pleadings on 
file herein and now being well advised in the premises does 
enter its Findings of Pact and Conclusions of Law as follows: 
FINDINGS QF FACT 
1. The parties herein were residents of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah for more than three (3) months immediately 
preceding the filing of this action. 
2. The parties are husband and wife having been married 
on September 3, 1965, in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
3. During the marriage the parties reached a point where 
they could no longer live together. The parties became 
unsupportive of each other and the differences which arose 
between the parties became wholly irreconcilable. 
4. There were four (4) children born as issue of the 
marriage, two (2) of whom are minor children, to wit: Sherry 
Hammond, born June 5, 1974; and Denise Hammond, born June 16, 
1978. The parties have entered into the following oral 
agreement regarding the issues of custody and visitation, which 
oral agreement is confirmed and accepted by the court and shall 
be made a part of the Decree of Divorce to be entered in this 
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matter. The oral agreement is that the parties shall have joint 
legal custody of the children and the plaintiff shall be awarded 
sole physical custody of the children. The defendant is 
entitled to reasonable visitation and the exact days and times 
of visitation should be agreed upon by the parties in the best 
interest of the children. In the event the parties cannot agree 
upon the exact days and times of visitation, then the defendant 
is awarded visitation with the minor children on alternate 
weekends beginning Friday at 6: 00 p. m. and returning the 
children to plaintiff on Sunday by 6:00 p.m. The defendant is 
awarded visitation one (1) evening per week commencing at 5:00 
p. m. and terminating at 8: 00 p. m. The defendant is awarded 
visitation on alternate holidays and on father' s day and 
defendant' s birthday. The defendant is awarded visitation 
beginning Christmas day at 1: 00 p. m. and continuing through one-
half (1/2) of the children's total Christmas school vacation. 
Defendant is awarded visitation for Thanksgiving in even-
numbered calendar years commencing at 6: 00 p. m. on Wednesday 
until 6: 00 p.m. on Sunday. Defendant is awarded visitation for 
Easter in odd-numbered years commencing at 6: 00 p.m. on Friday 
until 6: 00 p. m. on Sunday. Holidays take precedence over the 
weekend visitation and no changes should be made to the regular 
rotation of the alternating weekend schedule because of 
holidays. Defendant is awarded visitation for four (4) 
continuous weeks during the children' s summer vacation. 
Defendant shall provide written notice of the dates to plaintiff 
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at least thirty (30) days in advance of the four (4) week 
period. 
5. The parties have orally agreed that the defendant will 
pay to the plaintiff child support in the amount of $163. 52 per 
month per child for a total of $327. 04 per month. The court has 
reviewed the oral agreement relating to the issue of child 
support and finds that the amount to be paid as child support 
does conform to the guidelines required by Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 78-45-7, et seq. The defendant shall pay child support 
for the parties minor children until said children die, marry or 
reach the age of eighteen (18) and graduate from high school 
with their regularly scheduled class, whichever occurs first. 
Child support will be paid through the Office of Recovery 
Services in one (1) lump sum on or before the 5th day of each 
month. 
6. The parties have reached an oral agreement relating to 
the issues of health and medical care for the minor children as 
well as provisions for life insurance. The parties have agreed 
that if either the plaintiff or defendant is able to obtain 
health and accident insurance through their place of employment 
that the party who is able to obtain the coverage for the lowest 
cost shall provide the insurance coverage. In the event the 
plaintiff is unemployed or is unable to obtain health and 
accident insurance through her place of employment, then the 
defendant shall provide health and accident insurance for the 
benefit of the minor children of the parties. Any medical or 
4 
dental expenses incurred for the children which are not paid by 
the policy of insurance shall be shared equally by the parties. 
The parties have agreed that the plaintiff will provide to the 
defendant medical and dental expense records for the years 1990 
and 1991 which were not covered by health and accident insurance 
and the defendant will pay one-half (1/2) of the uncovered 
expenses. The parties have agreed that the defendant shall 
continue in full force and effect his existing life insurance 
policy in the amount of $38,000. 00. He shall designate the 
minor children as beneficiaries of the policy and shall name his 
mother, Jane Hammond, as Trustee for the children under the 
policy. Such policy shall be maintained until the defendant is 
no longer required to pay child support. The court finds the 
terms of the oral agreement to be reasonable and such terms 
should be adopted and incorporated into the Decree of Divorce in 
this matter. 
7. The parties have agreed that the defendant will pay 
the debt due on his Beneficial Life Insurance Company policy and 
will hold the plaintiff harmless therefrom. The parties further 
agree that any debt due by the plaintiff on any policy of 
insurance on her life shall be paid by plaintiff and she will 
hold the defendant harmless therefrom. The court finds the 
terms of the agreement to be reasonable and such terms should be 
adopted and incorporated into the Decree of Divorce in this 
matter. 
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8. The plaintiff has agreed to waive any rights she may 
have to alimony. 
9. The parties have orally agreed that the plaintiff 
should be awarded sixty-five percent (65%) of the net proceeds 
of the HHEICO contract and the defendant should be awarded 
thirty-five percent (35%) of the net proceeds of the HHEICO 
contract. The parties have agreed that the current net proceeds 
from the HHEICO contract are $777. 00 per month. The plaintiff 
shall be entitled to receive $505.05 per month and the defendant 
shall be entitled to receive $271.95 per month from the HHEICO 
contract. In the event the net amount received from the HHEICO 
contract shall differ from the $777.00 per month, then the 
parties shall divide the net proceeds sixty-five percent (65%) 
to the plaintiff and thirty-five percent (35%) to the defendant. 
The court finds the terms of the oral agreement to be reasonable 
and such terms should be adopted and incorporated into the 
Decree of Divorce in this matter. 
The parties have orally agreed that the home located at 
2440 Vail Circle, Sandy, Utah shall be listed for sale until it 
is sold. The listing price shall initially be determined by Mr. 
Fred Law, the realtor with whom the property is currently 
listed. Upon sale of the property, any equity after payment of 
the mortgage and any liens on the property and payment of 
realtor' s fees and any other costs associated with the sale of 
the property shall be divided one-half (1/2) to the plaintiff 
and one-half (1/2) to the defendant. During the time the home 
6 
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is for sale and until the sale of the home occurs, the plaintiff 
shall not cohabit with anyone in the home. In the event the 
plaintiff cohabits in the home then the defendant' s equity shall 
be determined as of that date and the plaintiff shall make 
immediate payment to the defendant of the net equity to which he 
would be entitled after deducting the mortgage and any other 
liens against the property and after deducting any realtor' s 
fees and any costs associated with the sale of the home. The 
current monthly mortgage payment on the home is $987.00 per 
month. The defendant shall immediately bring current the house 
payments, however, the defendant shall not be required to make 
house payments that are in arrears in an amount that exceeds 
$2,961.00, the equivalent of three (3) monthly payments. The 
plaintiff shall continue to have the right to reside in the home 
until such time as the home is sold. Commencing May 1, 1991, 
the defendant shall pay one-half (1/2) of the monthly mortgage 
payment in the amount of $493. 50 and the defendant shall pay 
one-half (1/2) of the monthly mortgage payment in the amount of 
$4 93. 50. The court finds the terms of the agreement to be 
reasonable and such terms should be adopted and incorporated 
into the Decree of Divorce in this matter. 
10. The parties have reached an oral agreement that each 
party shall retain his or her own respective IRA accounts, 
retirement accounts, pension plans, profit sharing plans, 
stocks, bonds and/or other securities. The court finds the 
terms of the agreement to be reasonable and such terms should be 
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adopted and incorporated into the Decree of Divorce in this 
matter. 
11. The parties have agreed that each should be awarded 
one of the cemetery lots. The court finds the terms of the 
agreement to be reasonable and such terms should be adopted and 
incorporated into the Decree of Divorce in this matter. 
12. The parties have agreed that any previous judgments 
obtained by the plaintiff against the defendant arising out of 
this action shall be considered to be paid in full. The court 
finds the terms of the agreement to be reasonable and such terms 
should be adopted and incorporated into the Decree of Divorce in 
this matter. 
13. The parties have orally agreed that each should be 
awarded the personal property in their respective possessions) 
with the exception that the defendant will receive the 
following: orange couch, love seat, rocking chair, lamp, vespa 
scooter, and one-half (1/2) of the food storage. The court 
finds the terms of the agreement to be reasonable and such terms 
should be adopted and incorporated into the Decree of Divorce in 
this matter. 
14. The parties have reached an oral agreement that the 
1988 Toyota automobile should be awarded to the defendant 
subject to any debt thereon and he shall hold the plaintiff 
harmless therefrom. The plaintiff shall be awarded the 1988 
Mitsubishi automobile subject to any debt therefrom and she 
shall hold the defendant harmless thereon. The 1978 Pontiac 
8 
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automobile shall be sold to the parties daughter for a 
reasonable amount and the proceeds divided fifty percent (50%) 
to the plaintiff and fifty percent (50%) to the defendant. The 
court finds the terms of the agreement to be reasonable and such 
terms should be adopted and incorporated into the Decree of 
Divorce in this matter. 
15. The parties have reached an oral agreement that the 
defendant will assume and pay the obligation owed to Jane 
Hammond in the approximate principal amount of $5,100.00 and 
will hold the plaintiff harmless therefrom. The court finds the 
terms of the agreement to be reasonable and such terms should be 
adopted and incorporated into the Decree of Divorce in this 
matter. 
16. The parties have reached an oral agreement that each 
should be responsible for his or her own debt incurred 
subsequent to the date of separation that date being November 
1, 1989/ and that each will hold the other harmless therefrom. 
The court finds the terms of the agreement to be reasonable and 
such terms should be adopted and incorporated into the Decree of 
Divorce in this matter. 
17. The parties have reached an oral agreement that they 
each recognize that as a result of the foreclosure action taken 
on the condominium described as Unit 105/ Building D, Sunwest 
Resort/ Springdale, Utah/ that one or both of them may be liable 
for a deficiency. The parties have agreed that they will each 
be responsible for any deficiency pursuant to the documents they 
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may have previously executed with the lender on the property or 
according to law. The court finds the terms of the agreement to 
be reasonable and such terms should be adopted and incorporated 
into the Decree of Divorce in this matter. 
18. The parties have agreed to recommend to the court that 
the issue of contempt relating to the defendant be dismissed. 
The court/ after considering the recommendation of the parties, 
finds that the contempt issue relating to the defendant should 
be dismissed. 
The court finds from the evidence presented that the 
plaintiff relied upon the representations of the defendant that 
he would split the proceeds of the 1989 federal tax refund in 
the amount of $1/ 500. 00 with her when he obtained her signature 
on the check. The court finds that the word "splitting" may not 
necessarily mean a fifty/fifty split but in the context in which 
the defendant obtained the plaintiff' s signature, the plaintiff 
reasonably assumed that the defendant meant that he would give 
her one-half (1/2) of the proceeds. The court finds that the 
defendant shall pay to the plaintiff one-half (1/2) of the 1989 
federal tax refund in the amount of $750. 00 and that the 
plaintiff shall have judgment against the defendant for that 
amount. 
19. During these proceedings it has been necessary for the 
plaintiff to be represented by counsel. The court finds that 
the time and charges incurred by the plaintiff for attorney' s 
fees in the amount of $9,183. 50 in these proceedings were 
10 
reasonable for the work incurred and within normal community 
standards. The court has read the exhibits, heard the testimony 
and is mindful of plaintiff and defendant' s situations regarding 
income and debt. The court finds that the defendant should pay 
one-half (1/2) of the attorney's fees incurred by the plaintiff, 
that being the amount of $4,591. 75 and that the plaintiff is 
entitled to a judgment against the defendant for attorney' s fees 
in the amount of $4,591. 75. The court further finds that the 
defendant has the ability to pay the fees and the plaintiff has 
need for assistance in paying of the fees. Further, the court 
finds that the defendant is to pay his own attorney' s fees. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, this court does 
enter its just and equitable Conclusions of Law as follows: 
1. This court does have jurisdiction to enter a Decree of 
Divorce in this matter. 
2. Each of the parties should be awarded a Decree of 
Divorce against the other upon the grounds of irreconcilable 
differences. 
3. The oral agreements entered into between the parties 
should be made a part of the Decree of Divorce which is to be 
entered in this matter. 
4. The plaintiff should be awarded judgment against the 
defendant in the amount of $750. 00 for her one-half (1/2) of the 
1989 federal tax refund. 
11 
5. The plaintiff should be awarded judgment against the 
defendant in the amount of $4,591,75 for attorney' s fees and 
costs she has incurred in this matter. 
DATED this C ^ 7 5 \ day of May, 1991. 
BY THE >^OUkT: **' £>> 
Approv, to form: 
^^xui irffT'Mi t s unaga 
^ Attorney for Defendant 
^ rft/ti 
(hammond. l o l / k k ) 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BERDENE HAMMOND, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DON LEE HAMMOND, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 894904063 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on October 15, 
1993. The plaintiff, Berdene Hammond, was present and represented 
by James B. Hanks. Defendant, Don Lee Hammond, was also present 
and represented by David J. Hodgson. At the conclusion of the 
trial the parties submitted proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and post-trial Memoranda. On November 17, 1993, 
the matter was submitted to the Court for decision. 
This is an order to show cause proceeding initiated by the 
plaintiff in which she is seeking a finding that the defendant has 
willfully and intentionally violated provisions of the Decree of 
Divorce. Specifically, plaintiff claims that defendant (1) failed 
to pay her 50% of the proceeds from the sale of a 1978 Pontiac 
automobile as required by paragraph 13 of the decree and (2) 
improperly encumbered and eventually lost a contract in which 
plaintiff claims she had an interest and from which under the terms 
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of the decree she derived a monthly income in the amount of 
$505.05. 
The Court has now carefully considered the evidence, the 
arguments of counsel and the post-trial memoranda. Based on the 
foregoing, and for good cause shown, the Court hereby enters the 
following ruling. 
Turning first to the issue of the car proceeds, there is no 
dispute that the car referenced in paragraph 13 of the decree was, 
in fact# sold for $800 and that defendant was obliged to pay 50% of 
the sale proceeds ($400) to plaintiff. Defendant claims he did not 
violate the decree, however, because at the time of the car sale, 
he was providing sole support for the couple's minor children and 
did not have the ability to pay a portion of the amounts owed to 
plaintiff. 
Defendant admits he failed to communicate with plaintiff about 
the sale of the car or otherwise attempt to negotiate an offset of 
proceeds to her from the child support he was paying. 
Based on the evidence at trial, the Court finds by clear and 
convincing evidence that defendant knew of his obligation to pay 
50% of the car proceeds and that he failed to make good on that 
obligation. However, the Court is not persuaded by clear and 
convincing evidence that defendant had the ability to pay the 
A ft O o f\ * 
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proceeds as required because of his then-existing financial 
condition resulting from his being the sole provider for the minor 
children. Accordingly, the Court does not find defendant in 
contempt of Court for failing to comply with this provision of the 
decree. 
Turning next to the contract issue, paragraph 7 of the decree 
provides as follows: 
The plaintiff is awarded 65% of the net proceeds of 
the HHEICO contract and the defendant is awarded 35% of 
the net proceeds of the HHEICO contract. The current net 
proceeds from the HHEICO contract are $777 per. [sic] The 
plaintiff is entitled to receive $505.05 per month and 
the defendant is entitled to receive $271.95 per month 
form the HHEICO contract. In the event the net amount 
received from the HHEICO contract shall differ from the 
$777 per month, then the parties shall divide the net 
proceeds 65% to the plaintiff and 35% to the defendant.1 
The following facts are undisputed. On or about November 
1992, the defendant borrowed $25,000 from David Moench and pledged 
1
 The HHEICO contract resulted from the sale of an 
apartment building in which the defendant had an interest. The 
sale took place approximately 15 years ago and the defendant was 
given a promissory note to secure his interest. The note was 
assumed by several different parties over the years. On May 29, 
1990, and pursuant to a further sale of the note, the defendant was 
given an All Inclusive Trust Deed in the amount of $274,993.08. 
This note is referred to in the decree as "the HHEICO contract." 
Pursuant to the terms of the note, the makers were obligated to pay 
defendant the amount of $2,577.46 each month beginning June 20, 
1990. After paying various senior notes and encumbrances, $777 was 
left as net proceeds to be distributed pursuant to the terms of the 
decree. 
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the HHEICO contract as security. The defendant borrowed the money 
to purchase stock in a gold mining venture which was to produce a 
return of $10,000 in 30 days. The defendant did not inform the 
plaintiff he was pledging the HHEICO contract as security, nor did 
he make any attempt to obtain her consent to do so. The $25,000 
loan was due on or about the first week of January 1993. The 
defendant defaulted on the loan and lost the HHEICO contract to 
David Moench. The HHEICO contract was subsequently sold to the 
defendant's brother-in-law. 
It is also undisputed that at the time the HHEICO contract was 
lost, the balance owing on the contract was $262,951.41, with 218 
payments remaining. 
At the order to show cause hearing, plaintiff argued that 
defendant had no right to encumber the HHEICO contract and that he 
should be found in contempt for doing so. Defendant claimed he 
should not be found in contempt of Court because the decree did not 
prohibit him from selling, transferring or otherwise disposing of 
the contract and that plaintiff was only entitled to receive 65% of 
whatever he received per month from the contract. 
Based on the Court's review of the evidence, the Court hereby 
rejects defendant's argument and specifically finds by clear and 
convincing evidence that defendant knew of the plaintiff's interest 
in the contract as set forth in the decree and that she was 
00530;; 
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entitled to receive $505,05 per month from the contract or, 
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clearly and unambiguously sets forth the relative interests in the 
contract ~wo parties. There no language whatsoever in 
t r 
given the right incumber it. defendant was not 
entitled to undermine the interest of plaintiff in the HHEICO 
c o n I i i I 
The Court therefore specifically finds by clear and convincing 
evidence that defendant willfully and intentional] iolated the 
deer ee 1:: ], s JI: it :::i imber :ii i l g the HI IEIC0 s 
consent or knowledge. 
Accordingly, based on the foregoing, the Court hereby finds 
the defendant contempt ^ouxt. 
With regard to appropriate sanction, the Court hereby 
specifical] at the balance owing on the contract was 
$26i»
 l( "i1.! i »,i " payments remaining , to which plaintiff 
reasonably could expect receive $505.05 per month.2 
2
 Defendant argued that the decree recognized the 
possibility that the actual monthly proceeds might vary and, 
therefore, plaintiff should not receive a flat $505.05 per month. 
While this may be true, the only evidence before the Court is that 
the monthly payments were coming in as originally contemplated in 
the decree. Moreover, to the extent there is any uncertainty about 
what the future payments will be, it is defendant who through his 
misconduct has created that uncertainty and in an equitable 
proceeding as this i s, he cannot benefit from hi s own misconduct. 
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Finally, plaintiff relied on the HHEICO contract payments for her 
support. 
Accordingly, the defendant is ordered to pay plaintiff the 
amount of $505.05 per month, beginning the first day of the month 
following the entry of the final order in this matter, for 218 
months, for a total equal to the amount that plaintiff would have 
received under the HHEICO contract had the defendant not lost it of 
$110,100.90 ($505.05 X 218 = $110,100.90). 
The defendant is further ordered to serve 30 days in the Salt 
Lake County Jail for his contempt of Court. The jail sentence 
shall be suspended so long as defendant complies in a timely manner 
with the payment provisions set forth above. In the event he 
defaults in any of these conditions, he shall be ordered to serve 
all 30 days without any further suspension. 
Also, in the event the defendant defaults in his monthly 
payment obligation to plaintiff, the plaintiff shall determine the 
net present value of the balance remaining to be owed to plaintiff 
by discounting the dollar amount by the contract rate (9.75%) and 
shall be entitled to a Judgment in that amount. So long as 
defendant is current in his monthly obligations, plaintiff shall be 
stayed from executing on the Judgment. 
A A n o< /\ t-
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Plaint il ! is .IIMJ awarded her reasonable,:1 .i'iil necessar 
incurred attorney's fees and costs in connection with this matter, 
which Court finds to be $2#008.35. 
Plaint ,rs counsel > prepare F indings ol Fart and 
Conclusions of Law and Order consistent with this ruling 
Dated this 
ANNE M. STX$B&&$£^jrz^ 
DISTRICT C0tR$JV9&&p''/ 
'^CiiSijjaK^-' 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this I $& day of 
January, 1994: 
James B. Hanks 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
376 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
David J, Hodgson 
Attorney for Defendant 
2102 East 3300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
TATE OF-DTfl^K'S OFFICE 
Van Lake County Utah 
&P 9 1994 
* + * 
HAMMOND, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
BERDENE D. HAMMOND, (Dennison) 
Defendant. 
Case No. 894904063 DA 
Transcript o^* 
JUDGE'S BENCH RULING 
on Contempt Proceedings 
* * * 
BHFORK THK IIONOHAHLK J III K IK ANNK 
S a l t Lake C i t y , U t a h 
Wednesday , A u g u s t 14 
APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintiff: DAVID J. HODGSON 
Attorney at Law 
2102 East 3300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
JAMES B. HANKS 
Attorney at Law 
376 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
REPORTER: SUZANNE WARNICK, CSR, RPR-CM 
Official Court Reporter 
4 240 East 400 South, #304 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
5 Phone: 801-535-5470 
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1 WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 31, 1994; A.M. SESSION 
2 J U D G E ' S B E N C H R U L I N G 
3 
4 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, counsel, 
5 Ms. Dennison and Mr. Hammond. 
6 Well, I do appreciate the thoroughness in which 
7 counsel have presented this matter to the Court. And the 
8 matter is whether Mr. Hammond is in contempt of court for the 
9 conduct that's been discussed here today. The burden is on 
10 Ms. Dennison to establish by clear and convincing evidence 
11 that, first of all, that Mr. Hammond knew he had this 
12 obligation, that he knew that he could not encumber the 
13 HHEICO contract or lose the HHEICO contract as he has said, 
14 that there has been a knowing and willful failure to comply 
15 with that obligation. And the Court has considered all of 
16 the evidence that's been presented to the Court on this issue 
17 or previously and now here today. And based on that the 
18 Court is prepared to rule. 
19 First of all with regard to the Decree, the Decree 
20 clearly provides for an income stream to Ms. Dennison, then 
21 Mrs. Hammond, from the HHEICO contract. The only way she 
22 would not receive an income stream from the HHEICO contract 
23 was if there was no money from the HHEICO contract. For 
24 example, if the folks from whom — who are obligated to pay 
25 Mr. Hammond under that HHEICO contract, if they did not pay 
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1 uiiuex. m e contract and there were no proceeds from the 
2 contract, then Mr. Hammond wouldn't have anything to disburse 
3 
4 beyond his power. But certainly t< (tie extent that there was 
5 :1 
6 entitled to receive 65 percent _i those proceeds. Clearly 
7 I In it was provided for Decree. 
8 The Court is convinced by clear and convincing 
9 evidence that Mr. Hammond was nnf- entitled to take action 
U himself to defeat that right. *i**« --as a bargained-for 
i provision in the Decree. Both parties were represented W 
counsel. 
0
 In fact, M~ Hammond indicated that when he 
, obtained the Divorce Decree, that he contacted his counsel, 
c
 and he evidently didn't like the term -•* tuit contract and 
0 complained to his counsel taken 
n
 4
 * * decree. And clearly the Decree provisions stanc The 
d : 
1 provision suggests, itself, that he 
u o 
^articular contract. 
z h 
sought, r - example, ixtu star * 'i lammond 
m in in MI I h a l II,I'l fi;:11 e e t 
really entitled to do that because no one knew exactly what 
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1 the proceeds were going to be on a month-to-month basis. 
2 They were set at the levels they were in the contract because 
3 that was the current level at the time of the Decree. But 
4 clearly that was contemplated that that might fluctuate and 
5 that he is obligated to pay 65 percent. 
6 Well, this particular contract was lost because of 
7 actions that Mr. Hammond took unilaterally without conferring 
8 with Ms. Hammond, without obtaining her consent to alter that 
9 term. And for example, had that gone through and he actually 
10 had succeeded in a wise investment and gotten money back, 
11 then he would be in a position of having to renegotiate the 
12 terms of the Decree, if you will, seek a modification of that 
13 because he would no longer be getting the HHEICO contract 
14 proceeds of which she's entitled to 65 percent. Arguably she 
15 could have gotten more than $505 or she would have been 
16 entitled to less. But he was taking action to unilaterally 
17 just fix a monthly payment, even if he were successful. And 
18 clearly he is not entitled to do that. 
19 It is plain to the Court, it is clear to the Court 
20 by clear and convincing evidence, that under the express 
21 terms of the provision he had no right to encumber the HHEICO 
22 contract, and he had no right to risk losing it. There did 
23 not need to be a specific provision in the Decree to make 
24 clear that he was prevented from encumbering the HHEICO 
25 contract. By virtue of the language in the Decree, it's 
A A n r e% ii 
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cxecix unau ne was not entitled to encumber that contract. 
Therefore, by clear and convincing evidence, the Court finds 
provide that support as contemplated in the express language 
circumstances in such a way undermine or negate that 
7 on. 
Now, the evidence is also clear that *ras aware 
9 gation 11 is 
evidently a couple of months after the Decree was entered. 
i he was aware of the provision. He received a nnnv he 
Decree. He was represented by counsel. ****u arguably, even 
1 -***- the time the Decree was entered because he was .represented 
4 by counsel, he had knowledge of this. But certainly shortly 
c ^x^.^_ 4-u^  decree was entered, the evidence i s undisputed that 
0 he received a cop of the Decree. 
1
 It appears that Mr. Hammond made choices as t~ u~>w 
d (if i « iji,11 "The M>" i s 
nothing compelling him son-in-law and 
action he d i ci wi th regard to that HHEICO contract. And then 
obligation that mother , . , going 
i 
tc make these payments to Ms. Hammond, and he chose in the 
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1 face of all of that to ignore the Court-ordered obligation 
2 and then in his discretion pay off these other individuals or 
3 attempt to pay off these other individuals. 
4 It seems very clear — in fact, it's more clear 
5 today than it was at the previous hearing in the Court's 
6 judgment — that Mr. Hammond — that there was a clear duty 
7 to maintain that contract. That Mr. Hammond knew he had this 
8 obligation, and that he willfully and knowingly violated that 
9 provision in disobeyance of the Court Order. Therefore, the 
10 court finds that Mr. Hammond is in contempt of court. 
11 With regard to the attorney's fees that have been 
12 proffered, the Court finds that Mr. Hammond is obligated to 
13 pay those attorney's fees. That they are reasonable and 
14 necessarily incurred for the proceedings following the trial. 
15 The Court has previously dealt with attorney's fees through 
16 the end of the other proceeding, but that these additional 
17 proceedings have been necessary consistent with the Court's 
18 ruling previously, and that it's been necessary for 
19 Ms. Hammond to continue to prosecute this claim. 
20 Accordingly, the Court awards the attorney's fees proffered 
21 by counsel in this case, and also for costs, if she has 
22 incurred any, for this additional proceeding. 
23 Have I overlooked anything, counsel? 
24 MR. HANKS: Your Honor, as far as remedy, what he 
25 needs to do. In the prior order of the Court, your Honor, 
n ft A K 9 <« 
had, I believe, ordered him LU pay her $505.50 a month — xii 
-•
l
- i words, to restore what she had - -"id you, imposed a 
entence g 
i head to get his compliance. We'd ask for that, and 
ldgment 
except that I would say that i t is clear, based 
Hammond1 s brother-i n- 1 aw , I: hat there 
another possible solution, _ _ think that it's 
pprQpt t o o r c j e r that that happen because I 
_.. _ „.iow if Mx. Hammond can obtain that kind of financing. 
"*
 1§n
 *
nY event — obviously that's a possibility that I 
14 w*.^.*A^  .*.** prudence Mr. Hammond ought to consider. And if he 
K
 ^oo *r* ~an reinstate the HHEICO contract, then obviously 
A^*c parties would be back to where they were before the 
17
 HHEICO contract was lost. 
xo So, I would just urge Mr. Hammond to consider 
in 4-u~.t. i^-.o. T.._
 n o t inciuding that in the fi nal judgment. 
20 Very well. Thanh y it . I'mjil " f. in recess. 
21 MR. HANKS: Thank yoil. 
22 (This concludes ) 
23 * 
24 
25 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
2 STATE OF UTAH ) 
3 COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
4 I, SUZANNE WARNICK, CSR, RPR-CM, do certify that I 
5 am a Certified Shorthand Reporter, Registered Professional 
6 Reporter with the Certificate of Merit, and a Notary Public 
7 in and for the State of Utah. 
8 That at the time and place of the proceedings in 
9 the foregoing matter, I appeared as the court reporter in the 
10 Third Judicial District Court for the Honorable Judge Anne M. 
11 Stirba, and thereat reported in stenotype all of the 
12 proceedings had therein. 
13 That thereafter, my said shorthand notes of the 
14 Judge's Bench Ruling were transcribed by computer into the 
15 foregoing pages; and that this constitutes a full, true and 
16 correct transcript of the same. 
17 WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL in Salt Lake City, Utah on 
18 this, the 7th day of September 1994. 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
My commission expires; 
25 1 April 1995 
^a^r?^ A 
Suzannef Warnick, CSR, RPR-CM 
J 
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My Commission Fxp.res I 
April 1, 1995 I 
State of Utah ! 
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ADDENDUM D 
Order and Judgment 
and 
and Coi ic] i i s i oi is of I .aw 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah JAMES B. HANKS (4331) 
JAMES B. HANKS, P.C. 
Western Financial Center 
376 East Fourth South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-2886 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Deputy Clerl 
BERDENE D. HAMMOND, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DON LEE HAMMOND, 
Defendant. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
SRbSHS 
Civil No. 894904063 DA 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court for trial on 
October 15, 1993. The Plaintiff, Berdene (Hammond) Dennison, was 
present and represented by James B. Hanks. Defendant, Don Lee 
Hammond, was also present and represented by David J. Hodgson. At 
the conclusion of the trial the parties submitted proposed Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and post-trial Memoranda. On 
November 16, 1993, the matter was submitted to the Court for 
decision. On or about January 4, 1994, the Court filed a 
memorandum decision in favor of the Plaintiff. Pursuant to the 
Courts ruling, the Plaintiff filed proposed Findings of Fact and an 
Order and Judgment. 
ft ft (P. * ft /» 
On or about February 8, 1994, the Defendant filed a "Motion to 
Alter or Amend Judgment, or in the Alternative, Motion for a New 
Trial." The Court ruled on the Defendant's Motion on May 16, 1994 
and denied the Motion. The Court did, however, reopen the trial 
for "the limited purpose of hearing evidence concerning whether the 
Defendant had the right under the decree to encumber the HHEICO 
contract, whether he had a right to encumber the contract without 
the consent of the Plaintiff, and whether his conduct of pledging 
the HHEICO contact without the Plaintiff's consent constitutes 
contempt of Court." 
Pursuant to the above ruling, the trial was reopened on August 
31, 1994. The Defendant appeared and was represented by his 
attorney, David Hodgson. The Plaintiff appeared and was 
represented by her attorney, James B. Hanks. 
The Court, having fully reviewed the documents on file, having 
heard testimony from the witnesses and being fully informed in the 
premises, ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES: 
1. The Defendant is ordered to pay Plaintiff the amount of 
$505.05 per month, beginning the first day of the month following 
the entry of this order, for a period of 218 consecutive months. 
This eguals the amount that Plaintiff would have received under the 
HHEICO contract had the Defendant not lost it. In the event the 
Defendant defaults in his monthly payment obligation to Plaintiff, 
2 
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the Plaintiff shall determine the net present value of the balance 
remaining to be owed to Plaintiff by discounting the dollar amount 
by the contract rate (9.75%) and shall be entitled to a judgment in 
that amount. 
2. The Defendant is further ordered to serve 30 days in the 
Salt Lake County Jail for his contempt of Court. This jail 
sentence shall be suspended so long as Defendant complies in a 
timely manner with the payment provisions set forth above. In the 
event he defaults in any of these conditions, he shall be ordered 
to serve all 30 days without any further suspension. 
3. Plaintiff is awarded judgment against the Defendant for 
her reasonable and necessarily incurred attorney's fees and costs 
in connection with this matter, which the Court finds to be 
$2,708.35. 
4. The Plaintiff is awarded judgment against the Defendant in 
the amount of $400 representing her share of the Pontiac sales 
proceeds. , ft 
Dated this \C\ day of NCSEinBer, 1994. "£§*~~*l£w 
ANNE M. STIRBA<^^.^.^§&' 
District Court JudW^wc?^^^ 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that on the day of November, 1994, I mailed, 
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing document 
to the following: 
David J. Hodgson 
2102 East 3300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
"TfprMQufr Vtfx^ vKKft a 
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FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
JAMES B. HANKS (4331) 
JAMES B. HANKS, P.C. 
Western Financial Center 
376 East Fourth South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 255-2886 
Attcprney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BERDENE D. HAMMOND, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSION OF LAW 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
DON LEE HAMMOND, : Civil No. 894904063 DA 
Defendant. : Judge Anne M. Stirba 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court for trial on 
October 15, 1993. The Plaintiff, Berdene Hammond (Dennison), was 
present and represented by James B. Hanks. Defendant, Don Lee 
Hammond, was also present and represented by David J. Hodgson. At 
the conclusion of the trial the parties submitted proposed Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and post-trial Memoranda. On 
November 16, 1993, the matter was submitted to the Court for 
decision. On or about January 4, 1994, the Court filed a 
memorandum decision in favor of the Plaintiff. Pursuant to the 
Courts ruling, the Plaintiff filed proposed Findings of Fact and an 
Order and Judgment. 
Deputy Clerl 
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On or about February 8, 1994, the Defendant filed a "Motion to 
Alter or Amend Judgment, or in the Alternative, Motion for a New 
Trial." The Court ruled on the Defendant's Motion on May 16, 1994 
and denied the Motion. The Court did, however, reopen the trial 
for "the limited purpose of hearing evidence concerning whether the 
Defendant had the right under the decree to encumber the HHEICO 
contract, whether he had a right to encumber the contract without 
the consent of the Plaintiff, and whether his conduct of pledging 
the HHEICO contact without the Plaintiff's consent constitutes 
contempt of Court." 
Pursuant to the above ruling, the trial was reopened on August 
31, 1994. The Defendant appeared and was represented by his 
attorney, David Hodgson. The Plaintiff appeared and was 
represented by her attorney, James B. Hanks. 
The Court, having fully reviewed the documents on file, having 
heard testimony from the witnesses and being fully informed in the 
premises, now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. This is an order to show cause proceeding initiated by the 
Plaintiff in which she is seeking a finding that the Defendant has 
willfully and intentionally violated provisions of the Decree of 
Divorce. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that Defendant (1) failed 
to pay her 50% of the proceeds from the sale of the 1978 Pontiac 
2 
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automobile as required by paragraph 13 of the decree and (2) 
improperly encumbered and eventually lost a contract in which 
Plaintiff claims she had an interest and from which under the terms 
of the decree she derived a monthly income in the amount of 
$505.05. 
2. Turning first to the issue of the car proceeds, there is 
no dispute that the car referenced in paragraph 13 of the decree 
was, in fact, sold for $800 and the Defendant was obliged to pay 
50% of the sale proceeds($400) to Plaintiff. Defendant claims he 
did not violate the decree, however, because at the time of the car 
sale, he was providing sole support for the couple's minor children 
and did not have the ability to pay a portion of the amounts owed 
to Plaintiff. 
3. Defendant admits he failed to communicate with Plaintiff 
about the sale of the car or otherwise attempt to negotiate an 
offset of proceeds to her from the child support he was paying. 
4. Based on the evidence at trial, the Court finds by clear 
and convincing evidence that Defendant knew of his obligation to 
pay 50% of the car proceeds and that he failed to make good on that 
obligation. However, the Court is not persuaded by clear and 
convincing evidence that Defendant had the ability to pay the 
proceeds as required because of his then-existing financial 
condition resulting from his being the sole provider for the minor 
3 
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children. Accordingly, the Court does not find Defendant in 
contempt of Court for failing to comply with this provision of the 
decree. 
5. Turning next to the contract issue, paragraph 7 of the 
decree provides as follows: 
The Plaintiff is awarded 65% of the net proceeds of the 
HHEICO contract and the Defendant is awarded 35% of the net 
proceeds of the HHEICO contract. The current net proceeds from the 
HHEICO contract are $777 per. [sic] The Plaintiff is entitled to 
receive $505.05 per month and the Defendant is entitled to receive 
$271.95 per month from the HHEICO contract. In the event the net 
amount received from the HHEICO contract shall differ from the $777 
per month, then the parties shall divide the net proceeds 65% to 
the Plaintiff and 35% to the Defendant.1 
6. The following facts are undisputed. On or about November 
1992, the Defendant borrowed $25,000 from David Moench and pledged 
the HHEICO contract as security. The Defendant borrowed the money 
to purchase stock in a gold mining venture which was to produce a 
return of $10,000 in 30 days. The Defendant did not inform the 
Plaintiff he was pledging the HHEICO contract as security, nor did 
1
 The HHEICO contract resulted from the sale of an 
apartment building in which the Defendant had an interest. The 
sale took place approximately 15 years ago and the Defendant was 
given a promissory note to secure his interest. The note was 
assumed by several different parties over the years. On May 29, 
1990, and pursuant to a further sale of the note, the Defendant was 
given an All Inclusive Trust Deed in the amount of $274,993.08. 
This note is referred to in the decree as "the HHEICO contract." 
Pursuant to the terms of the note, the makers were obligated to pay 
Defendant the amount of $2,577.46 each month beginning June 20, 
1990. After paying various senior notes and encumbrances, $777 was 
left as net proceeds to be distributed pursuant to the terms of the 
decree. 
4 
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he make any attempt to obtain her consent to do so. The $25,000 
loan was due on or about the first week of January 1993. The 
Defendant defaulted on the loan and lost the HHEICO contract to 
David Moench. The HHEICO contract was subsequently sold to the 
Defendant's brother-in-law. 
7. It is also undisputed that at the time the HHEICO contract 
was lost, the balance owing on the contract was $262,951.41, with 
218 payments remaining. 
8. At the Order to Show Cause Hearing, Plaintiff argued that 
Defendant had no right to encumber the HHEICO contract and that he 
should be found in contempt for doing so. Defendant claimed he 
should not be found in contempt of Court because the decree did not 
prohibit him from selling, transferring or otherwise disposing of 
the contract and that Plaintiff was only entitled to receive 65% of 
whatever he received per month from the contract. 
9. Paragraph 7 of the Divorce Decree clearly provides an 
income stream to the Plaintiff from the HHEICO contract. The 
Defendant was not entitled to take action, unilaterally, to defeat 
that right. The Plaintiff's interest in the HHEICO contract was a 
bargained for provision in the Divorce Decree. Both parties were 
represented by counsel. 
Mr. Hammond indicated that when he obtained the Divorce 
Decree, he contacted his counsel because he evidently didn't like 
5 
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the language set forth in paragraph 7. However, no action was 
taken to amend the decree. The fact that Mr. Hammond complained to 
his counsel and was not happy with that provision suggests, in and 
of itself, that he was aware that there were limitations on what he 
could do with that particular contract. 
10. The HHEICO contract was lost because Mr. Hammond took 
unilateral actions without conferring with the Plaintiff or 
obtaining her consent to do the same. 
11. It is plain to the Court, by clear and convincing 
evidence, that under the express terms of paragraph 7, the 
Defendant had no right to encumber the HHEICO contract and he had 
no right to risk losing it. There did not need to be a specific 
provision in the decree to make clear that he was prevented from 
encumbering the HHEICO contract. By virtue of the language in the 
decree, it is clear that he was not entitled to encumber that 
contract. 
12. The evidence is also clear that the Defendant was well 
aware of the obligations and rights set forth in paragraph 7. He 
received a copy of the decree. He was represented by counsel. 
13. The Defendant did not encumber the HHEICO contract 
because of financial duress or compulsion. The Defendant claimed 
that he encumbered the HHEICO contract in an investment designed to 
return a large profit so that he could buy out his daughter and 
6 
son-in-law's interest in a house. The Defendant also testified 
that because the investment went sour, the home was sold he used 
his share of the proceeds to pay a debt owed to his mother. The 
Defendant was not compelled or required to do either of the above. 
The Defendant was, however, obligated to abide by the terms of the 
Divorce Decree which provided a monthly payment to the Plaintiff. 
The Defendant ignored his court ordered obligation. 
14. Based on the Court's review of the evidence, the Court 
hereby rejects Defendant's argument and specifically finds by clear 
and convincing evidence that Defendant knew of the Plaintiff's 
interest in the contract as set forth in the decree and that she 
was entitled to receive $505.05 per month from the contract or, 
alternatively, 65% of the actual proceeds received. The decree 
clearly and unambiguously sets forth the relative interests in the 
contract of the two parties. There is no language whatsoever in 
the decree that suggests the Defendant was awarded the contract or 
given the right to sell or encumber it. 
15. With regard to an appropriate sanction, the Court hereby 
specifically finds that the balance owing on the contract was 
$262,951.42 with 218 payments remaining, to which Plaintiff 
reasonably could expect to receive $505.05 per month.2 
2
 Defendant argued that the decree recognized the 
possibility that the actual net monthly proceeds might vary and, 
therefore, Plaintiff should not receive a flat $505.05 per month. 
7 
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16. The Plaintiff relied on the HHEICO contract payments for 
her support. 
17. The Plaintiff has incurred $2,708.35 in attorney fees and 
costs in prosecuting this matter. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Defendant was not entitled to undermine or defeat the 
Plainitff/s interest in the HHEICO contract. 
2. The Court specifically finds by clear and convincing 
evidence that the Defendant knew of his duty to maintain the HHEICO 
contract and willfully and knowingly violated the Divorce Decree by 
encumbering the HHEICO contract without the Plaintiff's consent or 
knowledge. 
3. Based upon the Findings of Fact and the evidence at trial, 
the Court hereby finds the Defendant in contempt of Court. 
While this may be true, the only evidence before the Court is that 
the monthly payments were coming in as originally contemplated in 
the decree. Moreover, to the extent there is any uncertainty about 
what the future payments will be, it is Defendant who through his 
misconduct has created that uncertainty and in an equitable 
proceeding as this is, he cannot benefit from his own misconduct. 
8 
4. The attorney fees and costs incurred by the Plaintiff are 
reasonable in amount and were necessarily incurred because of the 
Defendant's actions. 
Dated th i s i2& "\>eci*vta^ day of Oesbefecr, 1994. 
GU.PA 
ANNE M. STIRBA 
District Court 
I certify that on the 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
day of October, 1994, I mailed, 
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing document 
to the following: 
David J. Hodgson 
2102 East 3300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
